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Abstract 
Over the past 30 years considerable work scrutiny has been undertaken in the area of 
corruption and its effect on many facets of society. In business, efforts to measure 
corruption have been frequently debated and models have been proposed to reflect 
different firm characteristics in the presence of corruption. Based on these measures, 
research usually considers single variable measures over time, generally cross-nationally. 
This study constructs a new model incorporating multiple different variables working in 
concert over the period from 2000-2015, to postulate a variety of different relationships 
and firm characteristics at the state level in the United States. In doing so, the model is 
constructed to limit biases that a single variable can have on the data. The model analyzes 
state level firm financial performance by utilizing ROA and Tobin’s Q as well as  
comparing high corruption state data to low corruption state data. The study finds that the 
presence of corruption increases the firm’s financial performance at the state level. These 
data are then used to conduct univariate testing with Ordinary Least Squares modelling to 
examine fixed firm effects as well as time lagged data. Significance is found to hold for 
these constraints and that firm financial performance is enhanced in high corruption states 
for most of the sample constructs. Supplementary models are subsequently constructed to 
test the robustness against significant economic events and legislative changes. The 
model is found to provide additional evidence when these tests are applied, thereby 
maintaining significance. The evidence from these tests are discussed and the conclusion 
reached is that corruption provides the opportunity for firms to enhance their financial 
performance, particularly for large firms, value firms, and firms with low leverage.  It is 
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also concluded that the benefits in performance from corruption are more beneficial in 
the short term. 
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Section 1: Introduction  
Corruption has increasingly become an important issue, both in the popular news as well 
as in academic research. Corruption, at its core, is an illegal activity that encourages involved 
actors to conceal their involvement. As a result, measuring corruption becomes problematic. 
Public corruption is defined as the abuse of public office for private gain (Boylen and Long, 
2003). Empirical research on corruption historically was relatively under-explored and the causes 
as well as consequences of corruption were largely focused around cross-country analysis 
(Lambsdorff, 1999a). Historically, the analysis of corruption has therefore been conducted from 
a cross-country perspective (Fisman and Gatti, 1998; Keefer and St. Knack, 1996; Mauro, 1997; 
Billger and Goel, 2009).  Other tools, such as the Corruption Perception Index (CPI) or the 
measurements by Transparency International are created by compiling professional 
assessment/surveys by agencies to determine investment risk pertaining to countries 
(Lambsdorff, 1999a). Using cross-country and other nation state specific analyses may prove 
problematic when exploring corruption.  One example of the limitation of using professional 
assessment is that these sources are largely subjective accounts of levels of corruption in various 
countries. These subjective perceptions have proven to be fairly good indicators of actual 
corruption levels and have also been useful to perform various regressions which incorporate 
additional macroeconomic data (Lambsdoff, 1999a). However, they are not necessarily ideal 
when creating a model of how corruption affects firm financial performance nor are they 
predictive of an environment conducive for corruption. The lack of predictive validity in 
describing an environments conduciveness for corruption is a significantly more difficult task 
than observation and detection of corruption. The fundamental need for determining an 
environment’s suitability for corruption activity would require understanding the mechanisms 
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behind corruption’s working, the question upon which the premise of this research is largely 
based. At present, there are many theories that surround corruption variables and how they are 
correlated with corruption, however cause-and-effect relationships remain scarce. Additionally, 
within these studies of variables, such as poverty and inequality, these variables are isolated, 
meaning that they are considered singularly. The thesis does not discredit these studies, in fact, it 
is due to these studies that the present study is possible, however, our study attempts to 
understand the greater effect of many socioeconomic variables as they interact with one another. 
As the public indices rely on subjective data when even the research is inconclusive, our research 
premise is that while corruption activity and commonality is easy to report, understanding the 
socioeconomic conditions that could and will lead to corruption activity is a significantly more 
difficult task, ill-suited to subjective account.   
 In examining cross-country analyses, it also becomes important to recognize that a 
country may not be not uniformly corrupt particularly in large countries where geography and 
non-homogeneity of populations provide additional concerns. In areas that consist of sufficient 
economic robustness and populations, corruption may vary by region. This premise is based on 
the analysis by Paldam (2002) who explains that in the Transparency International index, the 
difference in the level and growth of real income per capita, the inflation rate, and the economic 
freedom index affect the prevalence of corruption in a nation. Therefore, socio-economic factors 
are likely to have an effect on corruption and its prevalence in a country; the most obvious 
example being the United States which has different economic, geographical, and legal barriers 
for business based on the states in which they conduct their interstate operations.  
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The following study aims to incorporate and test the effect of different economic, 
geographical, and legislative differences between states to more fully understand corruption.  
Approaches by Goel and Nelson (1998), Fisman and Gatti (2002), and Smith (2016) measure 
corruption in the United States by considering the number of convicted public officials. 
However, these approaches also do not explain the factors of corruption and may, in fact, not be 
a good measure. From an analytical perspective, if corruption convictions are high it may be as a 
result of the rigor of the laws in that state or the resources of enforcement rather than the level of 
corruption itself. Because of this, more spending of government funds in to the judiciary may 
result in more convictions. Therefore, the number of convicted public officials may not be a true 
indicator of corruption (Lambsdorff, 1999a). Moreover, increased corruption convictions may, in 
fact, act as a deterrent to further corruption; with convictions being an indicator of stronger 
government monitoring of its agencies and better funding for its enforcement staff (Shleifer & 
Vishny, 1993, Lambsdorff, 1999a). Finally, most of the editorial coverage in news articles about 
corruption examine only one point in time, usually one year; this constraint could be seen as a 
limitation due a limited sample size in addition to socio-economic changes that can occur over 
the course of time. Research articles have attempted to measure corruption prior to this research 
effort however, these articles, as mentioned previously, measure a specific variable or they select 
a cross-sectional method spanning a single year or do not enhance their data analysis to consider 
state level observation. The need for a more comprehensive analysis of the different economic, 
geographical, and legislative differences between states and their effect on corruption would 
seem evident.  
 The media have also used correlations in predicting corruption, including 
competitiveness, judicial quality, and credit ratings (Galtung, 1997). Galtung (1997) provides an 
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overview of these correlations, however, it must be realized that explanatory variables are absent 
and, as a result, these correlations can be misleading due to potential spurious relationships being 
measured.  
 One of the seminal articles in the area of corruption is Lambsdorff (1999a), who 
conducted an empirical review on corruption literature. He used a number of different indices 
and academic studies that examined the efficacy of corruption variables as they pertain to being 
good indicators of corruption. Even within Lambsdorff’s study, the variables are not applied in 
tandem and the scope is largely restricted to a country-level analysis and, moreover, the question 
of how corruption affects economies and businesses remains unanswered.. As noted by Boylen 
and Long (2003), the concept of corruption has long faced a measurement problem and this 
continues to largely be unaddressed in the extant literature.  
 In order to sufficiently measure corruption, there is a need for both the presence of 
corruption as well as the data necessary to analyze. The United States, despite a low rank on the 
Corruption Perceptions Index (CPI), is a country that has a significant amount of corruption 
applicable to the day-to-day interactions between businesses and society as well as the necessary 
data to measure corruption’s effect. Smith (2016) has shown that locales in the United States 
exhibit different behaviors with regard to corruption and there are a variety of differential 
corruption behaviours as well as economic and geographical influences to consider. As a result, a 
state level analysis is necessary to truly measure corruption. Herein, locales are meant to measure 
regions of the United States. In Smith (2016) these locales could include whole states, parts of 
states, and more than one state. This could be observed as a more realistic measure as state 
divisions themselves are an arbitrary selection of territory. We find prudence in maintaining state 
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level analysis in our study due to the effect of state law as well as the wide variety of corruption 
variables measured in our sample. Therefore, both from a consistency and simplicity perspective, 
a model that divides corruption rigidly by state is more practical. This study is designed with a 
state level scope through an examination of a variety of state-level socio-economic variables that 
have been tested for their relationship with the prevalence of corruption. The study also intends 
to capture a more complete picture of the state level data state level and, as a result, does not 
homogenize the United States as a whole, thereby avoiding the error of ignoring significant 
differences between states.   
In order to better explore corruption at a state level, this study focuses on examining the 
effects of corruption on firm financial performance, at the state level, as measured by return on 
assets (ROA) and Tobin’s Q. The study first uses the literature on variables that favor corruption 
to build an index which classifies states as high or low corruption based on the prevalence of 
these variables. COMPUSTAT data are then used to compare business’ ROA and Tobin’s Q in 
high and low corruption states to determine if there is a significant performance difference. 
Section 2 of this paper provides a general background on corruption and economics. The rest of 
the paper is organized as follows: Section 3 presents observed effects of corruption on business 
behavior. Section 4 discusses corruption’s effect of business behavior. Section 5 reviews the past 
research conducted on this topic and builds the basis for the development of the current study. 
Section 6 outlines the methodology of the data analysis as well as justification for the model 
specifications. Section 7 presents the results and Section 8 contains the discussion and 
interpretations of the findings. Lastly, Section 9 contains the closing remarks and suggestions for 
future research. 
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The thesis’ contribution is based on a gap in the literature in that no study has been 
performed by compiling numerous reliable variables and examining their effects quantitatively at 
the state-level in the United States. By creating and using a research model that scores states 
based on corruption variables and using the model in conjunction with COMPUSTAT in a novel 
way, this thesis contributes to the existing literature on corruption and macroeconomic 
understanding. 
Section 2: Overview of Corruption 
 Corruption is both pervasive and significant throughout the world, particularly in 
developing countries. However, despite the majority of corruption being present in developing 
countries, there is still a strong presence of corruption in developed countries (Shleifer & Vishny, 
1993). In the developing world, government contracts can be sold for personal gain and local 
zoning laws are restructured due to bribes paid to various officials. Despite its prevalence, 
economic studies of corruption and its effects remain limited in the extant literature. Most of 
these studies focus on the principal-agent model of corruption focusing on the relationship 
between government and an official. In this relationship, there is an agency problem when an 
official takes bribes from private individuals interested in a benefit to be derived by government 
official or avoiding legislative action.  
 Cross-national studies of relationships across societal structures usually use expert 
opinions to measure the level of corruption in countries (Boylan & Long, 2003). A call for 
increased measures of corruption at the state level have been answered by attempts to recreate 
the same expert opinion methods used at the national level. However, at the state level, expert 
opinion is much rarer. As a result of this limitation, studies such as Smith (2016), Meier and 
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Holbrook (1992), and Goel and Nelson (1998) have used federal prosecutions and convictions to 
assess corruption at the state level.  
 A key issue with convictions and prosecutions in the US is how state law is executed 
differently across states. Based on these factors, corruption laws, interpretation, and prosecution 
differ from state to state. Lambsdoff (1999a) discusses the funding of the judicial system and 
prosecutors as well as their access to resources as a limiting factor of successful convictions, thus 
making this variable a potential liability for an accurate portrayal of corruption. There is also a 
body of literature that indicates the changing laws across states that have adopted different 
interpretations of corruption and regulation (e.g. Kennedy, 2010). Further to this point, in 2010, 
Citizens United v. FEC was passed (5-4) in the United States Supreme Court. Under this 
constitutional law, first amendment rights of ‘free speech’ were given to corporations, labor 
unions, and other associations. This applies to corporate financing of electoral campaigns and  
encourages a new potential, and legal, avenue of corruption behavior for corporations and 
politicians, by making campaign contributions legal (Kennedy, 2010).    
2.1 Political Approach  
Political scientists posit the argument that corruption is truly driven by irrational 
constructs of offices in the political system (Jiang, 2017) and this provides the opportunity for 
corruption to proceed due to the lack of monitoring in the system. Jiang (2017) and Brueckner 
(1999) provide arguments that corruption is more prevalent in decentralized systems and this 
provides a possible avenue in understanding why corruption in the US exists. State level systems, 
which are decentralized, govern a number of their structures that perform effective checks. 
Decentralized, state level systems also underscore the necessity of a state level analysis.  
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From a theoretical lens, agency theory explains predictable role confusion for politicians 
based on the definition of their duties. Kooiman (1993) defines government as all activities that 
guide, steer, and manage society. Within this definition, using agency theory, it may be assumed 
that the management of the needs of the people that occupy the society are considered as part of 
the activities that constitute ‘government’. Accepting Kooiman’s definition, it is possible to 
observe that politicians are the main agents whose responsibilities are directly involved inside 
the administration of the system of government. In this specific principal-agent relationship, the 
principal is society whose needs are addressed by government, their agent. However, when the 
opportunity exists to increase personal wealth through corporate bribes and corruption behavior, 
politicians may consider their needs before society, thereby becoming an agent for themselves 
rather than society. This creates a principal-agent problem and providing inroads for the 
possibility of corruption.   
2.2 Economic Approach 
 Basic economic paradigms would postulate that corruption is the result of an incomplete 
or obstructed market. This argument contends that a market based on fair exchange with equal 
competition would create strong opposition to corruption, as well as its associated activities. 
Within this argument is the consideration of state power and its role within economic activities 
and resource allocation. Economists seem somewhat divided. Some propose that a state level 
system provides a separate level of checks and balances to limit corruption activities and that 
centralized systems cannot achieve effective oversight. As an example, Wade (1997) proposed 
that over-centralized, top-down structures were responsible for corruption due to the inability of 
a large structure to be agile. This creates issues due to differing socio-economic demands across 
  
9 
 
a nation. This argument would favor smaller, more agile governments to readily adapt and place 
an additional level of monitoring on corruption activity.  However, this is at odds with 
arguments, including the consideration that the discretion, funding habits, and enforcement rigor 
within state level governments can encourage corruption activities in some states relative to 
others with stronger anti-corruption systems (Brueckner, 1999). Regardless, the conclusion 
remains that institutional changes in both social and economic systems are necessary to combat 
corruption.  
2.3 Sociological Approach 
 The fundamental proposition of this study is that socio-economic factors are key to 
determining the propensity for corruption in any given area. There is a body of research that 
indicates that both poverty and inequality have explanatory value in the propagation of 
corruption activity because it enables the rich to subvert the political, regulatory, and legal 
institutions of society for their own benefits (Glaeser at al., 2003). Poverty and inequality exhibit 
another reason why conviction rates, by themselves, may not necessarily be an effective measure 
of corruption. Inequality and poverty may lead citizens to believe that the system is ‘rigged’ 
against them, creating both a sense of dependency and pessimism for the future, and distort the 
institutions that should be dedicated to fairness in society (Uslaner, 2005). Moreover, inequality 
and poverty create the basis for corruption, which then reinforces poverty and inequality as 
“Economic dominance leads to money dominance in politics” (Sun, 2001, p. 256). 
 Based on the preceding factors, it is reasonable to assume that corruption is widespread 
through governance systems and its presence creates barriers to the effective operation of the 
judicial system. Additionally, it is important to note, that regardless of the effectiveness of the 
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judicial system, corruption convictions are a symptom, not a cause. Convictions, by their very 
definition, occur after corruption activities have already occurred. In this way, there will always 
be an accuracy concern of court proceedings that lead to a non-trial due to lack of evidence and 
loopholes in the code of state laws. This has become even more prevalent after the 
aforementioned 2010 United States Supreme Court Ruling on campaign contributions. A more 
effective measure of corruption would be to consider causal factors. Further, studies of 
corruption convictions do not provide a predictive model of corruption nor do they enhance our 
understanding of the socio-economic conditions that are conducive to corruption.  
Based on the examination of corruption from a variety of views it is clear that the causes 
of corruption are based in socio-economic factors and the relationships based on these factors 
have been discussed and reviewed by large body of research (Lambsdorff, 1999a). It is the 
contention of this study that by using these socio-economic factors, in concert with one another, 
a more reliable model of examining corruption can be established.  
Section 3: Corruption and Economics 
 This study relies solely on an economic approach as it is deemed to be critical to 
understanding of the effects of corruption (Rose-Ackerman & Palifka, 2016). However, there is 
conflicting information on how corruption may affect economic health. 
 Smith (2016) discusses the potential for ‘rent-seeking’ behavior by politicians as a 
method for corporations to gain access to advantages in their surrounding markets. This process 
is explained in more depth in Section 4. Along these lines of reasoning, corruption should 
provide a boost to economic outcomes, increasing profitability for businesses.   
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 In a related study, Lambsdorff (1999b) found a significant negative effect of corruption 
on GDP when examining 69 countries. The effect was observed by looking at capital 
investments and comparing corruption activity using  Transparency International’s ratings. 
Moreover, corruption is claimed to lessen economic performance by reducing the levels of trust 
in dealing with other businesses as well as the state;  usually manifest in the creation of trusted 
groups and the maligning of other groups based on reputational and contractual grounds (Landa, 
1994). In this way, business can become separated into a tribal mentality; weakening the effect 
of inclusive, non-discriminatory legal rules that are crucial in establishing a complex economy 
(Hayek, 1960; Weingast, 2005; Hodgson and Jiang 2007). 
 As a socio-economic variable, corruption is more present in areas with higher inflation 
rates. Blackburn and Powell (2011) posit a model that shows that corruption leads government to 
rely more on profit made from issuing currency, which means inflation rates are higher in those 
areas. Tsatsaronis and Zhu (2004) find that housing prices are heavily influenced by inflation. As 
a result, the change in housing prices is considered a proxy for inflation and thereby a corruption 
variable that merits measurement. Individual state level inflation measures have been difficult to 
acquire. 
 From the preceding models of prior studies, the relationship of corruption to the economy 
is complex. Moreover, corruption seems to have varying effects on economic health. As a result, 
corruption can have both a positive or negative effect on the economy.  
The literature also underscores a gap in research based on firm financial performance in 
corrupt environments. In corrupt environments, certain businesses succeed while others suffer. 
This study therefore proposes that there is likely a combination of firm characteristics that make 
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success more achievable in corrupt environments. In order to elucidate, this study examines the 
effect of corruption by considering varying corruption levels along with different business 
characteristics. The business characteristics considered are size, leverage, and liquidity. 
Consequently, it may be possible to create some clarity of corruption’s effect on economic health 
and how businesses may change their firm characteristics for their benefit in various corrupt 
environments.  
Section 4: Corruption and its Effect on Business Behaviour 
Corruption behavior influences a number of different decisions at the firm level. In order 
to reap success, a firm must consider the costs of the surrounding environment that can represent 
financial obstacles to firm success (Gingrich, 1995; Walley & Whitehead, 1994). Among these 
key considerations is how to manage firm stakeholder relationships (Berman, Wicks, Kotha, & 
Jones, 1999). Moreover, among these relationships, is the consideration of the political 
environment, particularly in the presence of corruption. How firms consider corruption may also 
differ individually and firms can view corruption either as an obstacle or opportunity.  
In Smith’s (2016) study, two competing hypotheses were developed to examine the effect 
of corruption on business operations. These hypotheses were 1) the shielding hypotheses and 2) 
the liquidity hypothesis. The hypotheses of Smith (2016) are based on previous literature 
positing that public officials can use tools of public office such as regulation and taxation to 
solicit extortion from firms, e.g. bribes (McChesney, 1987). Under this assumption, Smith (2016) 
assumes that firms respond by either seeking out or avoiding these events.  
Smith (2016) posits that under the shielding hypothesis, firms limit exposure to 
corruption by choosing financial policies that favor illiquidity and inflexibility. Under these 
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circumstances, politicians are discouraged from targeting these firms in corruption transactions 
to limit the chances of a firm’s relocation, bankruptcy, or lower investor returns. When a firm is 
forced into any of these conditions without the appropriate liquidity, the events are very 
observable and have a pronounced negative impact on the community in which the business 
operates. This could reduce the probability of being re-elected and increase the probability of 
being caught (Aidt, 2003; Stulz, 2005).  
In the liquidity hypothesis, Smith (2016) argues that firms actively seek corruption by 
choosing financial policies that favor liquidity and flexibility. Under these circumstances, 
politicians are encouraged by the abundance of firm liquidity to target these firms in corruption 
transactions. Firms will use this behavior to their advantage to accelerate bureaucratic processes 
and limit the regulatory burden on their operations. These firms can gain or maintain an 
advantage in the market and, in these circumstances, the likelihood of politicians being caught 
and convicted is greatly reduced due to the firm’s financial security and existing financial 
success (Aidt, 2003; Stulz, 2005).  
Smith (2016) finds support for the shielding hypothesis. While this study takes many cues 
from Smith (2016), it aims to measure the effect of corruption behavior on firm financial 
performance. Ostensibly, this study tests a hypothesis similar to Smith (2016), as well as the 
findings of previous works postulating that firms benefit from corruption through expedited 
access to government processes, or favorable government contracts and loan terms (Fisman, 
2001; Faccio, Masulis, and McConnell, 2006, Claessens, Feijen, and Laeven, 2008; Goldman, 
Rocholl, and So, 2009; Duchin and Sosyura, 2012; Tahoun, 2014).  
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Each firm has a mandate to maximize financial gain for the shareholders and, as a result, 
the decision-making processes of an organization should lead it to choose methods that best 
create favorable results for the firm. In this way, the firm should make decisions that maximize 
profitability, both in the short and long term. Performance is measured through ROA and Tobin’s 
Q.  It is expected that firms will only seek corruption if profit can be realized. If this is true, 
businesses should experience an increase in profitability in corrupt environments compared to 
environments with low corruption. Opposed to this, it is also expected that if corruption is 
prohibitive to profitability then firms in corrupt areas will experience a reduction in long and 
short term profitability in corrupt environments compared to environments with low corruption. 
As a result, two competing hypotheses are developed as follows: 
Performance hypothesis: Firms perform better in high corruption states relative to firms 
in low corruption states.  
Under this hypothesis it is suspected that ROA and Tobin’s Q increase in states with 
higher corruption within a firm’s local operating environment. It supports the idea that bribes 
paid to government officials confer an advantage to firms and that this advantage is observable 
through superior economic performance.  
Taxation hypothesis: Firms perform worse in high corruption states relative to firms in 
low corruption states. 
Under this hypothesis it is suspected that ROA and Tobin’s Q decrease in states with 
higher corruption within a firm’s local operating environment. This supports the idea of 
corruption being viewed by firms as a type of taxation. In this circumstance, firms pay bribes to 
offset harmful effects such as regulatory burdens and selective taxation. 
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Section 5: Literature Review 
 Throughout Section 5, a review of the literature is conducted to support this study. Based 
on this review, the study is intended to be unique in the sense that it applies variables together to 
create an index to quantify a corruption score. However, the question of how corruption affects 
economic performance, more specifically, firm financial performance and behavior, is not new. 
Indeed, the recent financial crisis of 2008, the implementation of the Sarbanes Oxley Act (SOX), 
and the passage of Citizens United have created new avenues for research on how these events 
have affected business performance and the relationship to corruption (Kang, 2010; Teachout, 
2014). Additionally, since the late 1990s there have been many extensive questions asked about 
the socio-economic relationships that are conducive to the establishment of corruption and the 
subsequent question of what the effect of corruption is on firm financial performance (Gaviria, 
2002; Ameer & Othman, 2012, Lambsdorff, 1999a).  
 Various studies have also examined corruption at its various levels and the interactions 
that it has with economics, society, and public institutions (Lambsdorff 1999b; Goel & Nelson, 
1998; Galtung, 1997). This section reviews the current literature and concludes by examining the 
metrics that Smith (2016) uses in the account of corruption effects on firm policies. 
5.1 Relationship of Corruption with Economics 
Previous studies of government involvement have shown that the overall size of 
government’s budget relative to the GDP is positively correlated with corruption activity. 
LaPalombara (1994) examined this correlation by using a sample of country level data. Another 
measure of corruption was proposed by La Porta et al. (1999) which examined government 
redistributive activity as a proxy for government size. This was captured by examining total 
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government transfers and subsidies and a positive correlation was found. Rose-Ackerman (1999) 
argues that the analysis by La Porta et al. (1999) is too simplistic and could be misleading. To 
support this point, an opposite correlation is presented by Elliot (1997). In Elliot (1997) a sample 
of 83 countries was used and the study reported that the size of the government’s budget 
decreases with levels of corruption. Husted (1999) also argues that governments are larger in 
societies which, culturally speaking, are more accepting and comfortable with authority. This 
underlying factor complicates the previous proposed methodologies as culture may determine 
both the size of government and corruption, thereby providing a quantitative analysis of the 
relationship between the two. 
 Earlier, decentralization was referenced, albeit loosely as a factor in determining 
corruption. Treisman (1999) found significant evidence that decentralized government systems 
are more corrupt than centralized ones. However, the relationship did not survive robustness tests 
when cultural variables were included. The conclusion of a meta-study by Lambsdorff (1999a) 
found that the difficulty was that the dummy variables used could not capture all the facets of 
decentralization. However, Huther and Shah (1998) and Fisman and Gatti (2002) proposed that a 
variety of sub-national expenditures in total public spending was a suitable measure of 
decentralization. Fisman and Gatti (2002) also find that fiscal decentralization in government 
expenditure and corruption has a strong negative relationship. Finally, Fung et al. (2005) found 
that more state owned enterprises led to more corruption, less transparency, and less market-
friendly institutions. They used this as a proxy to measure infrastructure investment and the 
relationship demonstrated is that construction spending is positively correlated to corruption 
levels.  
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 It may be argued that based on the extant literature, simplicity is rare as it pertains to 
corruption and its relationship to government size and involvement. Studies have also hinted at 
decentralization as being a factor that favors corruption (Bruckner, 1999, Fisman & Gatti, 1999; 
Lambsdorff 1999a), which would make sense based on potential compartmentalized 
governmental duties, lack of funding, and variable interpretation of the systems and legal codes. 
However, other studies suggest that decentralization could be a means to decrease corruption, 
potentially due to the agility provided by governments that do not have to centralize around a 
variety of bureaucratic government departments (Wade, 1997; Lambsdorff, 1999a). The extant 
literature is not conclusive and, as a result, cannot suggest clear policy reform. One additional 
consideration from the literature is the suggestion that government budgets are a strong 
determinant of decentralized government’s capacity to combat corruption.  
 In terms of economic health and corruption, studies have been conducted on the extent to 
which corruption can be explained by a low level of business competition and performance. 
Healthy economies that promote competition have been shown to lower the rents of economic 
activities and therefore reduce the motive of politicians to insert themselves as the middleman 
and extort businesses for personal gain. This has resulted in lower start up investment 
(Lambsdorff, 2007) due to possible delays in the issuance of permits to smaller, newer firms. 
World Bank data also shows that for corruption, countries with a more predictable and less 
opportunistic style of corruption have a higher level of investment rates (World Bank, 1997). 
 Henderson (1999) argues that corruption is negatively associated with business 
competition and governmental factors that favor economic freedom. Paldam (1999) further 
supported this conclusion in a multivariate regression analysis at the country level that included 
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variables for measuring GDP per capita. Other factors include a country’s openness rating as an 
indicator of corruption (Ades & Di Tella, 1995, 1997), the literature arguing that openness is 
negatively related to corruption through applying corruption data from Business International 
and the Institute for Management Development. They conclude that economic competition and 
the policies that favor openness are negatively related with corruption. Support for this 
conclusion was found in Brunetti and Weder (1998) who apply data from Political Risk Services 
in a cross section of 122 countries in bivariate regressions. Conversely, Treisman (1999) used 
Transparency International data and did not find significance for this effect. It would seem that 
this effect can be distorted by the interaction of GDP and competitive pressure and, as a result, 
this variable’s usefulness as a sole determining variable is in question. However, Ades and Di 
Tella (1995) test the idea of market dominance, meaning the extent to which a small number of 
firms dominate a market. The authors find that lower competitiveness, as defined by a few large 
firms dominating a market, is positively correlated with higher corruption. A hypothesis of larger 
firms being favored in higher corruption states is posited and discussed later in this document. 
The different findings of these studies are also indications that some corruption indices may be 
better than others when measuring corruption and its effects.  
5.2 Corruption’s Effect on Society 
 The economic benefits from corruption activity are likely to flow to the wealthy at the 
expense of the impoverished. Gupta, Davoodi, and Alonso-Terme (1998) perform a cross-section 
of 37 countries and find that corruption is significantly positively correlated with income 
inequality.  When controlling for GDP per capita, the correlation remains significant at the 10% 
level. It has been concluded that an increase in a country’s corruption is associated with a similar 
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increase in the Gini coefficient for that country. The authors test various instrumental variables 
to determine if corruption increases inequality and is not a case of reverse causality. Husted 
(1999) also finds that the relationship between corruption and inequality is two-way, in that, 
corruption leads to more inequality and more inequality leads to corruption. This also been 
supported by Swamy et al. (2001). Again, there must be an accounting for the effect of cultural 
contexts in society as they pertain to the relationship between corruption and society. Acceptance 
of authority and low accessibility of politicians may increase inequality and corruption at the 
same time (Lambsdorff, 1999a).  
Gupta, Davoodi, and Alonso-Terme (1998) also investigate the income growth of the 
bottom 20 percent of society. They conclude that growth of corruption exerts a significant 
negative impact on this income growth. Heckman (2011) finds that economic inequality can also 
lead to educational inequality.  
Based on this literature, it can be seen that there is a relationship established between 
poverty, inequality, and corruption. The exact nature of this relationship is unclear and cultural 
contexts can affect these relationships. Both would seem to provide an obvious avenue for 
research as, from a logical perspective, heightened poverty and inequality would provide an 
opportunity and motivation for government officials to solicit bribes and other corruption 
activity. The literature seems to universally support that poverty, inequality, and corruption are 
all positively correlated.  
5.3 Institutional Influence on Corruption 
 There is extensive debate in academic literature on whether corruption provides 
advantages by allowing businesses to expedite bureaucratic processes (Fisman, 2001; Faccio, 
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Masulis, and McConnell, 2006; Claessens, Feijen, and Laeven, 2008; Goldman, Rocholl, and So, 
2009; Duchin and Sosyura, 2012; Tahoun, 2014). Accounts have both supported and rejected this 
claim. Some academic literature has concluded that corruption causes the misallocation of 
resources which results in disadvantages for business performance (Kaufmann and Wei, 1999).  
The monitoring of government offices and quality of government institutions is thought to be the 
defining variable determining if corruption can be used to effect a result through corruption 
behaviour.  
 The World Development Report (1997) for example, focuses on the quality of the 
judiciary, which was found to significantly influence the level of corruption in the 59 countries 
examined. Similarly, Ades and Di Tella (1996) found a negative correlation between corruption 
and the independence of the judicial system.   
 Clausen, Kraay, and Nyiri (2011) show that lowered confidence in institutions exhibit 
increased propensities to engage in and tolerate corruption behavior. A large body of evidence 
also shows that a lack of confidence in public institutions undermines their effectiveness (Gibson 
and Caldeira, 1995; Putnam, 2000; Uslaner, 2002; Gibson et al., 2003; Mishler and Rose, 2005). 
Cho and Kirwin (2007) tie together the literature with their own studies and acknowledge that 
there is potential for reverse causality and propose the idea of a vicious cycle that corruption 
undermines confidence, leading to an increase in the perception of acceptability of offering 
bribes to obtain public services, which then increases the prevalence of corruption. This also 
leads to unions being a potential ‘last line of defense’ for workers when their public institutions 
fail to defend them. Under this premise, this study also proposes that union membership will be 
lower in high corruption areas. 
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 In summary, the literature points to institutional quality being a key player in corruption 
activity. Underfunding of government offices and lower confidence in governmental institutions 
is linked to higher corruption. However, the literature demonstrates that there can be a reverse 
causality where corruption can lower the trust in governmental institutions.  While some 
indicators support the idea that corruption lowers effectiveness of business performance, the 
preponderance of evidence points to the presence of corruption conferring a benefit to business 
performance.  
The literature also finds that education level is correlated negatively with corruption 
prevalence due to an increase on institutional effectiveness and trust (Hakverdian & Mayne, 
2012). Additionally, it is found that this creates a decline in voter turnout which can exacerbate 
the problem (Clausen, Kraay, & Nyiri, 2011).  
The hypothesis of this study is that there are differences in the benefits realized by 
businesses based on firm characteristics. This study hypothesizes that benefactors of corruption 
activity are larger, more well-established businesses, while smaller businesses cannot realize the 
benefits of corruption activity to the same extent. It is also proposed that states with higher 
poverty, GDP, and public spending, with lower education, institutional trust, and judicial 
funding, are more predisposed to corruption behaviour.  
Section 6: Methodology 
This study design involves scoring data for the index corruption variables based on US 
Census Bureau data and then comparing the data with metrics in COMPUSTAT to measure firm 
financial performance along with other metrics. COMPUSTAT data presents the financial data 
that is required to test firm financial performance. The corruption index is used to classify states 
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in terms of their corruption level and this is done by scoring states based on their presence of 
socio-economic variables that are conducive to corruption behavior as described in the literature. 
An average score for each year is then generated. When a state is above this average score in a 
given year, it is classified as a high corruption state.  When combined with the COMPUSTAT 
dataset with the corruption index, it can be measured if there is a difference in business financial 
performance in high corruption states compared to lower corruption states.  
 The COMPUSTAT data file is also modified to include industry data divided into the 
Fama-French 12 industry (Fama and French, 1997) classifications. COMPUSTAT observations 
are collected from the years 2000-2015 and the results are divided based on the Fama-French 
industry classes. There are a total of 51,580 observations for this study. The breakdown of this 
study’s observations into the FF12 classifications for each year are reported in Table 1.  
 Within COMPUSTAT’s individual observations of firms between these time frames the 
data are used to design the firm controls for the Ordinary Least Squares Regressions (OLS) in 
Tables 5 and 6. Firm controls for each company tested in the study were as follows ln (Total 
Assets), Leverage, Market-to-Book, and Current Ratio. Table 2 shows the details of each of the 
firm control variables.  
 This study initially tests the firm financial performance of businesses in high corruption 
states relative to low corruption states as indicated by the index. ROA and Tobin’s Q are then 
used as the proxy for business performance.  
ROA is a profitability ratio that provides a measure of the financial success of a firm. It is 
the measurement of earnings generated by assets independent of financing (Selling & Stickney, 
1989).  ROA is commonly calculated as follows:  
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𝑅𝑂𝐴 =
𝑁𝑒𝑡 𝐼𝑛𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑒
𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝐴𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡𝑠
  
ROA is usually used to determine the strength of the company’s management and 
typically, the higher the ROA, the better the management. There is some nuance to this principle 
however, not the least of which is industry standards. As an example, capital intensive industries 
tend to have lower ROAs on average.  
Tobin’s Q was introduced by James Tobin, a Nobel Laureate from Yale University. 
Tobin’s Q is the ratio between a physical assets market value and its replacement value (Tobin, 
1977). Tobin’s Q is typically utilized to explain a number of diverse corporate interactions. 
These include a variety of equity ownership and firm value examinations as well as, similar to 
ROA, appraisal of management performance (Chung & Pruitt, 1994). Tobin’s Q, most generally, 
is used to calculate a stock market valuation. Typically, the aggregate of stock market values for 
companies in a given market is divided by the aggregate of the replacement value of those assets. 
The equation is as follows:  
𝑇𝑜𝑏𝑖𝑛′𝑠 𝑄 =
𝑀𝑉𝐸 + 𝐷𝑒𝑏𝑡
𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝐴𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡𝑠
  
𝑤ℎ𝑒𝑟𝑒 𝐷𝑒𝑏𝑡 = (𝐷𝑒𝑏𝑡 𝑖𝑛 𝐶𝑢𝑟𝑟𝑒𝑛𝑡 𝐿𝑖𝑎𝑏𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑒𝑠) + (𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝐿𝑜𝑛𝑔 𝑇𝑒𝑟𝑚 𝐷𝑒𝑏𝑡) 
  Both these measures are commonly used in governance investigations as measures of 
firm performance. Simplistically, ROA is an indication of the accounting income that is 
produced for the shareholders of a company whereas Tobin’s Q is a metric of future cash flows 
produced by the firm. This means that Tobin’s Q is considered a long-term metric when 
compared to ROA. Using these metrics in conjunction with the model to classify high vs. low 
corruption states, the aim is to examine the effect of corruption on firm financial performance. 
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 This analysis controls variables for two primary reasons. The first concern is firm specific 
variables. As noted by Jensen (1986), firms in certain industries have different standards by 
which performance is considered. In short, ROA and Tobin’s Q are realized differently in 
different industries. As mentioned earlier, ROA for highly capital intensive firms is lower than 
firms which do not require significant capital to operate. When this difference translates to an 
industry, it may skew the data. The second concern is that of a time series issue. In economics, 
changes often have a lagged effect on the economy given varying speed of adjustment. As a 
result, it makes sense to lag the firm performance variables to test for explanatory power given 
the possibility of a lagged effect. For the purposes of our study we have lagged our variables for 
1 year.  
 Therefore, these concerns are addressed by creating three separate OLS models that 
control for these variables. The first OLS model controls for the firm controls previously listed, 
but is absent industry and yearly fixed effect and lagged variable controls. The second model is a 
variation on the first, as it controls for industry and yearly fixed effects. The third OLS model 
incorporates lagged ROA and Tobin’s Q controls in addition to the controls for industry and year 
in the second model.  
 In the robustness tests specific policy and economic events that may impact the results 
are considered. These OLS regressions are similar to the second model, however they exchange 
the sample based on the time of the legislative or economic event. These results are reported in 
Table 6.  
6.1 Data and Summary Statistics 
  
25 
 
The socio-economic variables that are linked to corruption are noted in the study as 
corruption variables from this point further. Their presence, or absence in some cases, is used as 
the proxy for the presence of corruption. The data were collected for all 50 US states from the 
US Census Bureau over the course of a 16 year period, from 2000-2015. Given each variable’s 
defined relationship, which will be subsequently discussed, if the state exhibits the presence (or 
absence) of a corruption variable in amounts greater (or less) than the median for that year, they 
acquire a score of 1 per corruption variable. The study contains 9 possible corruption variables, 
this gives any state in any given year between 2000-2015 the possibility of scoring between 0 
and 9. The specifics of the corruption variables are discussed in the next section. The Virgin 
Islands, Puerto Rico, and Washington D.C. are excluded from the analysis as some datasets from 
the US Census Bureau include these states while others do not. The state data uses percentages 
and per capita values in order to prevent the impact of population from biasing the results.  
COMPUSTAT observations were discarded based on non-reports in the data that would 
skew the results. Additionally, unreasonably high or low results were also discarded from the 
data. The total number of observations per year classified into their industry are presented in 
Table 1.  
6.2 Corruption Variables and Scoring 
 The method for scoring the corruption variables consists of determining a median value 
for the socioeconomic variable in question and then determining a median score based on the 
state and year specific data. As an example, Alaska having a poverty percentage of 8.5% in 2000 
is noted.  The median score for all 50 US states in 2000 is found to be 11%, which means that 
Alaska is below the median poverty rate and therefore receives a score of 0 for poverty. This 
  
26 
 
process is followed for each of the 50 states for the 16 year range. This process is repeated for all 
of the variables. 
The relationships of these variables differ on the type and based on the body of research 
surrounding their interaction with the presence of corruption. As a result, the corruption variables 
and how they were scored are listed. 
o Corruption Variable 1 = Poverty, if > median  1, otherwise 0  
o Corruption Variable 2 = GDP per Capita, if > median  1, otherwise 0  
o Corruption Variable 3 = State Budget, if > median 1, otherwise 0  
o Corruption Variable 4 = Housing Cost, if > median  1, otherwise 0  
o Corruption Variable 5 = Graduation Rate, if < median  1, otherwise 0  
o Corruption Variable 6 = Voter Turnout, if < median  1, otherwise 0  
o Corruption Variable 7 = Union Membership, i < median  1, otherwise 0  
o Corruption Variable 8 = Construction Spending, if > median s 1, otherwise 0  
o Corruption Variable 9 = Enforcement Spending, if < median  1, otherwise 0  
Each variable is then totaled for each state and year. This number is then matched to the 
firms in the COMPUSTAT database.  
6.3 Univariate Testing for Corruption’s Effect on Firm Performance 
 First, a simple univariate testing model is used to examine the differences between firms 
ROA and Tobin’s Q in high versus low corruption states. The means of high and low corruption 
states, their difference, and their significance level in Tables 3 (ROA) and 4 (Tobin’s Q), are 
reported respectively.  
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 Further, the univariate tests consider the financial performance differences based on 
corruption prevalence given certain firm characteristics. These comparisons are large firms 
compared to small firms; firms with high leverage firms compared to low leverage firms; firms 
with high liquidity compared to firms with low liquidity; high performance firms compared to 
low performance firms; and growth firms compared to value firms.  
 The divisions of the firms were determined using quartiles. As an example: large firms 
for a given year were determined by the top quartile of total assets for that year, where small 
firms were the bottom quartile. The same quartile method for liquidity, performance, leverage, 
and growth vs value was followed. Appendix II contains full details of this process.The means of 
these classifications are examined based on the various subsamples and report the results of 
mean ROA and Tobin’s Q in high and low corruption states, their differences, and their 
significance in Table 3 (ROA) and Table 4 (Tobin’s Q), respectively.  
6.4 Model 1 – Cross-firm OLS model without Fixed Effect or Lagged Variable Controls 
 A simple OLS regression is first conducted using the controls for firm characteristics. 
This model provides a broad sense of how corruption affects firm’s financial performance while 
incorporating a number of control variables to account for individual firm characteristics. The 
relationship was modeled by the following equation:  
𝑅𝑂𝐴𝑖 =  𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝐶𝑜𝑟𝑟𝑢𝑝𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑆𝑐𝑜𝑟𝑒𝑖 + 𝛽2𝑋𝑖 + 𝑢𝑖        (1) 
 The subscript 𝑖 in the above equation refers to the identification number of specific firms 
being analyzed, with 𝑋𝑖 representing their appropriate control variables and 𝑢𝑖 representing the 
corresponding error terms. Here, the outcome variable is the ROA using the COMPUSTAT 
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financial data for that year and the OLS regression examines the effect corruption has on this 
variable.  
 This model incorporated a number of control variables at the firm level. Firm size is 
routinely used as a control variable in the analysis of firm performance due to its link to market 
returns and Tobin’s Q (Carter et al, 2003). Firm leverage and liquidity are controlled for due to 
the effect it is predicted to have on the firm’s ability to adjust capital structure or pay bribes in 
the presence of corruption. Finally, the Market-to-Book (MB) ratio is controlled due to the firm’s 
valuation likely influencing if a firm is to be targeted by corruption behaviour. During these 
tests, the available COMPUSTAT data are used for the controls as well as for financial 
performance.  
 The same investigation was then conducted with Tobin’s Q replacing ROA as the 
dependant variable: 
 𝑇𝑜𝑏𝑖𝑛𝑄𝑖 =  𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝐶𝑜𝑟𝑟𝑢𝑝𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑆𝑐𝑜𝑟𝑒𝑖 + 𝛽2𝑋𝑖 + 𝑢𝑖    (2) 
The specifics of this test, including the control variables, are consistent with equation 1.  
6.5 Model 2 – Cross-firm OLS model with Fixed Effect Controls 
 The second OLS model has the same independent, dependent, and firm controls variables 
as in the first model, however, it further incorporates year and industry fixed effects as additional 
controls.  
𝑅𝑂𝐴𝑖 =  𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝐶𝑜𝑟𝑟𝑢𝑝𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑆𝑐𝑜𝑟𝑒𝑖 + 𝛽2𝑌𝑒𝑎𝑟𝑖 + 𝛽3𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑢𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑦𝑖 + 𝛽4𝑋𝑖 + 𝑢𝑖    (3) 
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 These additional variables are incorporated to control for the differential firm 
performance over time and by industry, as well as inflationary effects. By controlling for these 
conditions, the analysis measures the effect of corruption on firm financial performance.  
 Similar to Model 1, the analysis examining the effect of corruption was also conducted 
with Tobin’s Q as the dependent variable with the same controls as equation 3:  
𝑇𝑜𝑏𝑖𝑛′𝑠 𝑄𝑖 =  𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝐶𝑜𝑟𝑟𝑢𝑝𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑆𝑐𝑜𝑟𝑒𝑖 + 𝛽2𝑌𝑒𝑎𝑟𝑖 + 𝛽3𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑢𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑦𝑖 + 𝛽4𝑋𝑖 + 𝑢𝑖   (4) 
6.6 Model 3 – Cross-firm OLS model with Fixed Effect and Lagged Variable Controls 
 The third OLS model is similar to the second model, however, the lagged ROA variables 
are also incorporated in addition to the fixed effect year and industry controls. 
𝑅𝑂𝐴𝑖 =  𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝐶𝑜𝑟𝑟𝑢𝑝𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑆𝑐𝑜𝑟𝑒𝑖 + 𝛽2𝑌𝑒𝑎𝑟𝑖 + 𝛽3𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑢𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑦𝑖 + 𝛽4𝑅𝑂𝐴𝑡−1,𝑖 + 𝛽5𝑋𝑖 + 𝑢𝑖  (5) 
This model is the most incorporative model of the COMPUSTAT data that is available, 
while still allowing focus on the effect of corruption on firm financial performance. The lag for 
the variables, as indicated in the equation, is for one year. This lag allows us to account for past 
economic occurrences that may affect a firm’s financial performance.    
Similar to Models 1 and 2, the analysis examining the effect of corruption was also 
conducted with Tobin’s Q as the dependent variable with the same controls as equation 5: 
𝑇𝑜𝑏𝑖𝑛′𝑠𝑄𝑖 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝐶𝑜𝑟𝑟𝑢𝑝𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑆𝑐𝑜𝑟𝑒𝑖 + 𝛽2𝑌𝑒𝑎𝑟𝑖 + 𝛽3𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑢𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑦𝑖 + 𝛽4𝑇𝑜𝑏𝑖𝑛
′𝑠 𝑄𝑡−1,𝑖 +
𝛽5𝑋𝑖 + 𝑢𝑖            (6) 
6.7 Supplementary Models 
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 The primary models use the corruption score from the index as the explanatory variable, 
these models are heavily reliant on time and may not properly address the economic and 
legislative effects. Therefore, the supplementary models explore specifications that examine 
different time periods when significant legislation was implemented. As an example, Kennedy 
(2010) describes the implications of Citizens United as a crucial piece of legislation that changes 
the context of corruption behavior. As outlined in the literature review, a number of economic 
events have occurred both in terms of financial markets and legislation that could affect this 
relationship. In the analysis, for robustness testing, dummy variables have been added to specify 
relevant time periods corresponding to the implementation of legislation. During these tests, 
firm, industry, and year effects are controlled for. 
 The samples selected were as follows:  
Excluding the financial crisis years of 2007 and 2008:   
𝑅𝑂𝐴𝑖 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝐶𝑜𝑟𝑟𝑢𝑝𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑆𝑐𝑜𝑟𝑒𝑖 + 𝛽2𝑌𝑒𝑎𝑟𝑖 + 𝛽3𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑢𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑦𝑖 + 𝛽4𝑋𝑖 + 𝑢𝑖 , 𝑖 ≠ 2007,2008 (7) 
𝑇𝑜𝑏𝑖𝑛′𝑠 𝑄𝑖 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝐶𝑜𝑟𝑟𝑢𝑝𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑆𝑐𝑜𝑟𝑒𝑖 + 𝛽2𝑌𝑒𝑎𝑟𝑖 + 𝛽3𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑢𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑦𝑖 + 𝛽4𝑋𝑖 + 𝑢𝑖 , 𝑖 ≠
2007,2008                   (8) 
Only election years 
𝑅𝑂𝐴𝑖 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝐶𝑜𝑟𝑟𝑢𝑝𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑆𝑐𝑜𝑟𝑒𝑖 + 𝛽2𝑌𝑒𝑎𝑟𝑖 + 𝛽3𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑢𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑦𝑖 + 𝛽4𝑋𝑖 + 𝑢𝑖 , 𝑖 =
2000,2004,2008,2012                 (9) 
𝑇𝑜𝑏𝑖𝑛′𝑠 𝑄𝑖 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝐶𝑜𝑟𝑟𝑢𝑝𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑆𝑐𝑜𝑟𝑒𝑖 + 𝛽2𝑌𝑒𝑎𝑟𝑖 + 𝛽3𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑢𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑦𝑖 + 𝛽4𝑋𝑖 + 𝑢𝑖 , 𝑖 =
2000,2004,2008,2012               (10) 
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Years following the passing of SOX: 
𝑅𝑂𝐴𝑖 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝐶𝑜𝑟𝑟𝑢𝑝𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑆𝑐𝑜𝑟𝑒𝑖 + 𝛽2𝑌𝑒𝑎𝑟𝑖 + 𝛽3𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑢𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑦𝑖 + 𝛽4𝑋𝑖 + 𝑢𝑖 , 𝑖 > 2003       (11) 
𝑇𝑜𝑏𝑖𝑛′𝑠𝑄𝑖 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝐶𝑜𝑟𝑟𝑢𝑝𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑆𝑐𝑜𝑟𝑒𝑖 + 𝛽2𝑌𝑒𝑎𝑟𝑖 + 𝛽3𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑢𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑦𝑖 + 𝛽4𝑋𝑖 + 𝑢𝑖 , 𝑖 > 2003 (12) 
Years preceding the passing of Citizens United: 
𝑅𝑂𝐴𝑖 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝐶𝑜𝑟𝑟𝑢𝑝𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑆𝑐𝑜𝑟𝑒𝑖 + 𝛽2𝑌𝑒𝑎𝑟𝑖 + 𝛽3𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑢𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑦𝑖 + 𝛽4𝑋𝑖 + 𝑢𝑖 , 𝑖 < 2011       (13) 
𝑇𝑜𝑏𝑖𝑛′𝑠𝑄𝑖 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝐶𝑜𝑟𝑟𝑢𝑝𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑆𝑐𝑜𝑟𝑒𝑖 + 𝛽2𝑌𝑒𝑎𝑟𝑖 + 𝛽3𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑢𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑦𝑖 + 𝛽4𝑋𝑖 + 𝑢𝑖 , < 2011   (14) 
Through the robustness testing, the possibility of corruption variables affecting financial 
performance in a fashion that considers both significant legislative and economic events is taken 
into account and, as a result, these tests provide a more complete understanding of the data. 
Section 7: Results 
 This section presents the results of the empirical analysis noted in the previous section. 
The presence of corruption at the state level is found to be positively correlated with firm 
financial performance as measured by ROA and Tobin’s Q. This finding is consistent across all 
of the primary model specifications. The results suggest the effects of larger business size, 
smaller leverage, lower liquidity, and lower performance, incrementally affect both ROA and 
Tobin’s Q in high corruption states compared to low corruption states. It is posited that the 
results are fairly conclusive as they hold for the OLS models when controlling for firm, year, and 
industry fixed effects, and is robust across the other test models.  
7.1 Univariate Tests 
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 Tables 3 & 4 present the univariate findings. Here the differences of firm performance 
across the full sample as well as subsamples based on firm size, leverage, liquidity, performance, 
and growth orientation are reported.  
 In Table 3 ROA is examined as the dependant variable. Consistent with the performance 
hypothesis, it is found that the ROA for the full sample is statistically significantly higher for 
firms in high corruption states when compared to firms in low corruption states. This result is 
significant at the 0.01 level. It is consistently found in all of the subsamples, with the exception 
of one, that firms in high corruption states outperform firms in low corruption states. The 
exception to this finding was in the growth firm subsample, however, this result was not 
statistically significant. The results show incremental performance for high corruption states 
ranged from 0.01% (low performance subsample) to 8% (full sample) annually.   
 In Table 4, Tobin’s Q is examined as the dependant variable. Consistent with the 
performance hypothesis, it is found that Tobin’s Q for the full sample is statistically significantly 
higher for firms in high corruption states compared to firms in low corruption states. This result 
is significant at the 0.01 level.  It is consistently found in all the subsamples, with the exception 
of four, that that firms in high corruption states outperform firms in low corruption states. Two 
exceptions to this finding were noted but both were statistically insignificant (growth and high 
liquidity subsamples). The other two (value firm and high liquidity subsample) showed 
statistically significantly greater performance in low corruption states compared to high 
corruption states. The results generally show incremental performance for high corruption states 
ranging from 0.004 (high performance subsample) to 0.093 (full sample) annually.   
7.2 Regression Models 
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 In the OLS regression modeling in Table 5 the effect that corruption score has on firm 
financial performance is evaluated. First, a test is conducted that controls solely for firm fixed 
effects. The tests indicate that there is a positive significant difference in firm financial 
performance, measured by both ROA and Tobin’s Q, in high corruption states compared to 
businesses operating in low corruption states. The result is significant at the 0.01 level.  
This is further examined with the OLS model in Table 5, by considering firm, year, and 
industry fixed effects in the second model. A positive significant difference is reported in both 
ROA and Tobin’s Q when comparing these metrics between high corruption states and low 
corruption states. The result is significant at the 0.01.  
 Finally, the relationship between corruption and firm financial performance is evaluated 
through the OLS model by adding lagged variables while including the year, industry, and firm 
fixed effects. A positive significant difference in both ROA and Tobin’s Q is reported when 
comparing these metrics between high corruption states and low corruption states. The result is 
significant at the 0.01 level.  
7.3 Supplementary Models 
 In Table 6 the checks for robustness are reported. Each of these tests, controls for the year 
and industry fixed effects but not the lagged variables. The following robustness tests feature the 
same controls and tests as above, however the sample size is modified based on timelines of 
events significant to the data. The financial crisis years for one sample are excluded, only the 
election years are included for the second, the third includes the years after the passing of SOX, 
and the final sample is for the years before the passing of Citizens United. 
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 The regression test in Table 6 tests ROA and Tobin’s Q for the varying samples. It is 
found that the ROA is significantly higher for businesses in high corruption states compared to 
businesses in low corruption states. This significance holds at the 0.01 level throughout all of the 
sample selections. For Tobin’s Q it is found that it is significantly higher for businesses in high 
corruption states compared to businesses in low corruption states. It is also found that this 
significance holds at the 0.01 level throughout all the sample selections.  
Section 8: Discussion 
 This section discusses the results of the empirical analysis noted in the previous section. 
Corruption is found to be positively correlated with firm financial performance, as measured by 
ROA and Tobin’s Q. This finding is consistent across all of the primary OLS model 
specifications. Additionally, the results suggest that large firms, firms with low leverage, firms 
with stronger financial performance, and growth firms, all exhibit stronger financial performance 
in the presence of corruption as measured by the model. The models’ conclusiveness holds for 
the robustness controls, which include firm-level, year, industry, and lagged variable controls.  
8.1 The Effect of Corruption on Firms Financial Performance 
The effect of corruption on ROA is positively correlated with firm financial performance 
when controlling for variation between firms through the firm fixed effect analysis when 
conducting the cross-firm OLS between years 2000-2015. As shown in table 3 of the appendix, 
the full sample shows that for a 1% increase in corruption, firms exhibit an increase in ROA 
percentage points by about 0.08. This is observed based on first and second columns in Table 3 
that show the average ROA performance of firms in high corruption states (0.069007) and firms 
in low corruption states (0.060593). Both results are significant at the 0.01 level. In context, 
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Derfus et al. (2008) found that growth in industry of 1% resulted in a 0.36 percentage point 
increase in ROA. They also found that actions taken by firms related to things such as pricing, 
capacity, marketing, and new product delivery, led to a 0.03 percentage point increase in ROA, 
on average.  
 The simple univariate testing coupled with the OLS models which use cross-firm data 
evaluate the efficaciousness of this relationship. It is found that the controls exhibit an impact on 
this relationship, but they still exhibit significance at even the most stringent of specifications 
within the models.  
  Similar connections with Tobin’s Q are found. The univariate testing in Table 4 in the 
appendix shows that for a 1% increase in corruption, firms exhibit an increase in Tobin’s Q 
percentage points, by about 0.093 percentage points. Again, when coupling these with the OLS 
models, using cross-firm data, it is again found that the controls exhibit an impact on this 
relationship, but significance is maintained across even the most stringent tests. Based on this, 
the evidence suggests that firms in high corruption states perform better than firms in low 
corruption states.  
 The following sections explore this relationship in more depth and discuss a number of 
different relationships that corruption exhibits on firm financial performance based on the 
analysis of different firm characteristics. The results are discussed and presented with the 
differences and significance levels reported. More detailed results can be found in the tables in 
the appendices.  
8.2 The Effect of Corruption and Firm Size 
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 In the univariate testing in Table 3, it is found that larger firms tend to exhibit better ROA 
(0.0041404) and Tobin’s Q (0.061638) performance over the data set. These results were found 
to be significant at the 0.01 level for ROA and the 0.10 level for Tobin’s Q. This is explained by 
Beck, Demirguc-Kunt, & Maksimovic (2006) that small firms are most constrained based on the 
effect of financial, legal, and corruption problems when examining firm’s growth rates. A similar 
result in the data is observed for ROA (0.103713 vs 0.093575) and Tobin’s Q 1.988644 vs, 
1.923568) with results significant at the 0.05. It is reasoned that smaller firms have fewer 
systems to absorb the extra or unexpected costs associated with corruption behavior and 
therefore cannot benefit as much as large firms do. Larger firms are likely capable of realizing 
more benefits of corruption due to their increased resources such as capital assets, ability to 
acquire additional funding with greater ease, a larger amount of flexibility in their capital 
structure, a heightened visibility due to more recognition, as well as a larger number of 
employees in the organization which may allow them the capability of removing labor costs. One 
of the advantages of targeting larger firms in corruption seeking behavior is the reduced risk of 
bankruptcy filings. Smaller firms, as mentioned previously, do not have as many assets and their 
financial position likely lacks the same strength and flexibility. Smith (2016) also discusses how 
politicians can be deterred from targeting firms that have a chance at filing for bankruptcy due to 
the questions raised and the reduced likelihood of re-election.  
It was also discussed in the literature review that competition is a large factor as it 
pertains to corruption. The findings that larger firms tend to do better in states with higher 
corruption is in keeping with the extant literature. Larger firms are less susceptible to the 
competitive environment. Additionally, larger firms are more prevalent in less competitive 
environments. Both of these findings are correlated with higher levels of corruption. The 
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findings also support larger firms benefiting more significantly from corruption behavior due to 
the decreased importance on beating their competition with new product offerings or research 
and development. As a result, larger firms have more available funds to dedicate toward 
corruption behavior, such as rent-seeking.  
8.3 The Effect of Corruption and Leverage 
 In the univariate testing in Table 3, it is found that firms with lower leverage tend to 
perform better in high corruption states when compared to low corruption states in the proxy 
measures ROA (0.006) and Tobin’s Q (0.077) for measuring firm financial performance, results 
are significant at the 0.01 level for ROA and the 0.05 level for Tobin’s Q. This is explained 
building on a conclusion reached by Li, Meng, Wang, & Zhou (2008) which is that political 
connections increase the ability of firms to acquire financing. Also, when a firm has low leverage 
there are less restrictions on borrowing and a firm can acquire funding at a more desirable rate.  
This relationship is observed in the data as well. As a result of having low debt, there is 
more flexibility to adjust the capital structure, much like the discussion regarding larger firms. 
Additionally, with lower debt, firms are better targets for corruption activity due to a lower risk 
of bankruptcy, as well as the ability of firms who engage in corruption behavior to acquire 
additional funding to supplement their operations through debt financing. Finally, firms that have 
less debt are capable of acquiring more debt more easily; the findings of  Li et al. (2008) shows 
that this capability can be strengthened even further by utilizing their political relationships to 
acquire further debt financing. This would enhance a firm’s ability to develop their operations 
and realize the benefits leading to the increased financial performance as a result of corruption 
activity. 
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 High leverage firms are not a prime target for corruption behavior for many reasons, not 
the least of which is the possibility of bankruptcy. By having a large amount of debt in their 
capital structure, a combination of increased borrowing costs and increased debt payments may 
decrease the firm’s ability to maintain its operations resulting in the reported negative difference 
in Tobin’s Q when considering high corruption – low corruption (-0.051). This result is 
significant at the 0.01 level. This situation would force the firm to cull its operations or its labor 
costs. This situation is not as easily rectified as low leverage firms due to the decreased ability to 
change capital structure easily. In extreme cases, bankruptcy is a possibility. In all of these 
scenarios, it makes corruption more visible for enforcement agents to examine and decreases the 
likelihood of that politician being re-elected. This result is reinforced by examining the high 
leverage result in Table 4 and note that Tobin’s Q is lower for high leverage firms in high 
corruption states compared to high leverage firms in low corruption states. This indicates that the 
long term performance of firms with high leverage becomes compromised. This is in keeping 
with this study’s contention that the cost of borrowing money and additional cost of corruption 
behavior exert costs on a firm’s long term financial performance.  
8.4 The Effect of Corruption and Liquidity 
 The results of the tests on liquidity provide what would appear to be a counterintuitive 
result; low liquidity seems to positively affect firm financial performance in high corruption 
states relative to low corruption states when considering both ROA (0.01) and Tobin’s Q (0.077). 
Both of these results are significant at the 0.01 level. This seems at odds with previous research 
and even the previous results in this study which indicate that prime targets for corruption are 
firms that have the ability to participate in corruption behavior due to the ability to pay and 
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acquire cash. This trend is explained by observing a situation when firm financial performance 
has increased but liquidity has decreased due to the presence of corruption. It is reasoned that 
firms understand the incentive in the presence of corruption that maintaining low leverage is 
desirable to participate in corruption activities. In much the same way, more liquid firms are 
more able to participate in corruption behavior. However, in the data, it is observed that liquidity 
is reduced. It is assumed that the firm’s superior performance in high corruption states is due to 
the realization of benefits of participation of corruption behaviour by paying bribes and 
sacrificing their liquidity. Evidence is found by Boubakri, Cosset, and Saffar (2012) who 
conclude that a firm’s leverage can be increased through political connections, however, 
politicians can then pressure firms into overemployment to win the votes of employees and their 
relatives. The dual effect of rent-seeking behavior as well, as the overemployment serve to limit 
a firm’s liquidity. This would seem to present a significant hurdle to a firm performing better 
financially, however, these conditions are accepted by a firm through political favors that confer 
market advantages to firms, such as awarding of government contracts, lowered regulatory 
standards, or even reduction of enforcement rigor.  
 It is found that high liquidity firms do not perform significantly better in ROA (0.001) 
and Tobin’s Q (0.032) in high corruption states compared to high liquidity firms in low 
corruption states. Results for both are found to be statistically insignificant. This finding can be 
explained by the rationale that firms in high corruption states that have maintained their higher 
levels of liquidity have not engaged in corruption behaviour and, as a result, do not see an 
increase in their financial performance. By having high levels of liquidity, these firms make 
themselves prime targets for corruption. It is hypothesized that firms with high liquidity in high 
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corruption states have either not been approached by corruption opportunities or have declined 
them.  
8.5 The Effect of Corruption and Performance Effects 
 In the testing, the effect of performance is examined by testing firm’s ROA values as an 
independent variable in high corruption states compared to low corruption states. It is also found 
that high performance firms perform better financially, considering both ROA (0.008) and 
Tobin’s Q (0.004), in high corruption states compared to high performance firms in low 
corruption states. These results are significant at the 0.01 level for ROA and the 0.05 level for 
Tobin’s Q. This is in keeping with the previous findings and overall proposition of this study. If 
corruption confers an advantage to firms, then firms in high corruption states should have a 
higher performance than firms in low corruption states, which is seen in the data in Table 3 
through testing of the full sample. In this test, by comparing the two top quartile firms in both 
high corruption and low corruption states, it is found that the presence of corruption confers a 
boost in performance.  
 It is proposed that this increase in firm financial performance is likely due to regulatory 
and bureaucratic easing effects that corruption has on businesses. By engaging in corruption 
behavior these businesses are protected from the hurdles to which other businesses are subjected. 
Corruption is used as a tool to enhance the effectiveness and affordability of operations. Other 
results are likely to illustrate this advantage as well. It is also found that the ability to craft 
political relationships allows a firm to more easily acquire debt at more desirable rates. 
Additionally, firm size likely plays a role, allowing larger firms to perform significantly better 
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than a firm that does not possess the necessary relationships or resources which would hinder 
their ability to participate in corruption activity. 
 It is further found that low performance firms tend to perform better in ROA (0.000221) 
and Tobin’s Q (0.01) in high corruption states compared to low performance firms in low 
corruption states. Both results are significant at the 0.01 level. Based on the previously reported 
relationships, it is expected that low performance firms also make use of the same relationships 
in order to gain an advantage. In this particular case, it is consistent with the theory, as well as 
the reported findings. However, the findings indicate that the relationship is not as strong and 
while low performance firms in high corruption states perform better than low performance firms 
in low corruption states, high performance firms in high corruption states do even better still than 
high performance firms in low corruption states. It is proposed that this is due to low 
performance firms being less ideal targets by corruption behavior. Low performance firms are 
already inhibited in terms of their financial performance and, as discussed earlier, additional 
pressure from corruption activity may exacerbate these financial problems. Additionally, there 
would be a limit on the degree of benefit that a politician can exact from a low performance firm 
compared to a high performance firm. Accordingly, low performance firms which participate in 
corruption activity are not likely to exhibit as strong a relationship, nor are they likely to possess 
the same resources as high performance firms have. As a result, firm financial performance is 
likely to be less positively influenced. Indeed, this is what is observed in the findings. 
8.6 The Effect of Corruption and Firm Type 
 Finally, in the univariate testing, the difference in firm financial performance for both 
growth and value firms is examined and compared in both high and low corruption states. To 
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dichotomize the firms into growth or value, Tobin’s Q is used as the metric. High Tobin’s Q 
implies that there is a high level of future expected cash flow and as a result these firms are 
categorized as growth firms. A low Tobin’s Q indicates a firm that has less future cash flows and 
likely invests less in operational growth, therefore these firms are classified as value firms. Using 
growth or value as the independent variable, it is noted that value firms exhibit better firm 
financial performance, as measured by ROA, in high corruption states when compared to value 
firms in low corruption states. This result is expected based on the reasoning that firm stability is 
more desirable when considering rent-seeking behavior due to the possibility of bankruptcy. 
Value firms are historically more stable and therefore make a better target for corruption 
behaviour.  
 This increase in firm financial performance is likely due to the political favors exchanged 
for bribes paid. The same benefits are realized by value firms that other firms previously 
discussed realize through corruption behaviour and political relationship building. Through these 
benefits, the value firm realizes enhanced financial performance in ROA (0.062). The firms in 
low corruption states are less able to engage in these relationships and, therefore, cannot realize 
the same benefits. An interesting finding is that the Tobin’s Q is lower (-0.038) in high 
corruption states compared to value firms in lower corruption states. In this particular case, it is 
suggested that the benefits of corruption are short term in nature and corruption behavior takes a 
toll over time. In the case of value firms that are not expanding their future cash flows and it is 
expected that the burden of corruption behaviour eventually outweighs the benefits realized in 
the short term. Both of the results concerning Tobin’s Q and ROA at the 0.01 level. 
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 It is also found that growth firms do not exhibit differences in firm financial performance 
for ROA (-0.028) and Tobin’s Q (0.03) between high and low corruption states. This could be 
because growth firms are non-ideal targets for corruption behaviour due to a greater probability 
of illiquidity and subsequent bankruptcy. This is likely due to firms reinvesting their earnings to 
engage in growth activities such as purchasing of equipment or investing in research and 
development. Additionally, growth firms tend to be newer companies and, as a result, are 
unlikely to have the same recognition and resources as previously explained in the discussion 
sub-section on firm size. Based on this rationale, the results are consistent with what would be 
expected. 
8.7 Supplementary Models 
  The supplementary models are OLS models with industry and year fixed effects. Four 
different types of sample data are used based on different significant policy and economic 
events. It is found that corruption remains significant for both ROA and Tobin’s Q (0.020, 0.009 
significant at the 0.01 level) when considering all of the controls. The results exhibit robustness 
across all these tests. While the model supports the primary OLS models due to its robustness, it 
is also proposed that the additional examination deepens the analysis. Table 6 shows the 
supplementary models and, from this table, it is observed that the strength of the relationship 
changes as the different data clusters are examined. The results for ROA based measures are 
strongest in election years (0.037, significant at the 0.01 level) however, the Tobin’s Q measures 
(0.023) do not conform to this analysis. In fact, Tobin’s Q is lowest at this point based on the 
data tested. This finding is due to the future benefits of corruption behavior not yet realized in 
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firm financial projections as Tobin’s Q is a more long term approach to examine firm financial 
performance.  
 Most notably is the difference in ROA before the passing of Citizens United (0.037). This 
could be largely due to a number of additional avenues of corruption becoming legal, such as 
campaign contributions from corporations. A possible explanation for this is the weakening of 
the relationship of enforcement spending on corruption activities due to the wider range of 
corruption behavior permitted under the law.  
 
Section 9: Conclusion 
 The debate over corruption’s presence and significance in economic affairs, both locally 
and internationally, continue to be center-stage. As this debate continues, understanding the 
effect that corruption has on firm financial performance and its inextricable tie to economics 
becomes increasingly important. This study explored two chief aspects regarding corruption: 1) 
the study examined the presence of corruption at the state level by designing a corruption index 
based on a variety of socio-economic variables, and, 2) the study used the corruption index to 
aide in ascertaining the difference in firm financial performance between high and low 
corruption states. 
 The study employed a variety of univariate tests based on firm size, firm type, 
performance level, leverage, and liquidity as the independent variables and using firm financial 
performance, represented by ROA and Tobin’s Q, as the dependent variables. Additionally, 
supplementary regression models were employed testing different sampling dates. The models 
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maintained robustness throughout all of the testing. The analysis within this study is conclusive 
in finding support for the performance hypothesis; the presence of corruption improves firm 
financial performance, as measured by the proxy variables, ROA and Tobin’s Q. A variety of 
data breakdowns were conducted to test several independent variables. Leverage, firm size, and 
firm performance were all found to be positively correlated with higher firm financial 
performance in high corruption states compared to firms in low corruption states. It was also 
found that high firm liquidity is negatively associated with firm financial performance in high 
corruption states when compared to firms with high liquidity in low corruption states. Finally, it 
is reported that growth firms do not exhibit a significant difference between high and low 
corruption states. However, value firms tend to benefit from corruption’s presence. These 
findings are explained mostly through a firms’ ability to financially engage with the demands of 
corruption, such as funding bribes and overemployment. It is through these mechanisms that 
firms also receive the benefits of access to politicians, the awarding of government contracts, and 
the reduction of regulatory rigor. It is also discussed how the relationship of liquidity is justified 
through bribe payments and the difference of Tobin’s Q’s relation to value firms being different 
than that of ROA.  
 The supplementary models used in the study suggest that corruption was present at all 
times during the examination period. However, the models indicate it is more significant during 
election years for ROA, but less so for Tobin’s Q, as explained in the discussion on 
supplementary models. It was also found that SOX does not influence corruption’s significance 
in the models, however, corruption’s significance declines in the years before Citizens United 
passed.  
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9.1 Contribution to Research 
 Understanding the presence of corruption, its effect on economics and how socio-
economic variables relate to the incidence of corruption, can guide US policymakers on how to 
best fight corruption behavior and uphold the normative values of fairness of competition in state 
business markets. The findings have strong implications toward future policy action as they are 
based on the state level data provided by the US Census Bureau.  However, it is worth noting 
that this index, as the main contribution, is just a starting point and can be applied to many 
different aspects of economics and business. Additionally, it must be acknowledged that there 
are some weaknesses associated with the index in that it is not mutually exclusive. There are 
many other socio-economic variables that can be included in the index itself. These variables that 
were not readily measured or included could influence the relationship between any of the 
independent and dependent variables. 
 Finally, it is acknowledged that there is much additional work needed to truly understand 
how corruption interacts with firm’s financial performance and that firm’s financial performance 
consists of more than ROA and Tobin’s Q. It is likely that the inclusion of more than these two 
dependant variables may be necessary to illustrate the whole picture of corruption and firm’s 
financial performance.  
9.2 Future Research Consideration and Limitations  
One of the key considerations of future research into understanding corruption should be 
the consideration of direct vs indirect corruption. The study considers direct corruption behavior 
which means rent-seeking or bribe paying. However, corruption is more complicated than the 
construct defines. Indirect corruption is present in almost all cases of corruption, largely because 
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of its deniability. Direct corruption is the direct encouragement of unethical acts, whereas 
indirect corruption is the enabling of corrupt acts of someone else by not taking action, or by 
taking action against someone who attempts to stop corruption behaviour. While this study 
makes use of this difference and its considerations in the discussion, the model did not readily 
incorporate it into the measurement process. In order to have a more nuanced and complete 
understanding of corruption, the model should be expanded to make this distinction and 
operationalize a way to test and quantify it, as well as measure its impact on economic policies, 
practices, and results. Also, mentioned earlier in this study was the impact of institutional 
strength in the literature review, but this impact was not explored within this study’s model. 
There has been a strong body of evidence that shows that institutional strength is a significant 
deterrent of corruption activities based on theoretical constructs. This study cannot quantify the 
impact of this relationship, nor the veracity of this claim, but these attributes could very well be 
critical pieces of understanding corruption and its relationships, as well as guiding policy makers 
in effective policing and reduction of corruption in modern society.  
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Appendix I 
Table 1: Summary Statistics 
Year FF1 FF2 FF3 FF4 FF5 FF6 FF7 FF8 FF9 FF10 FF11 FF12 Total 
2000 227 97 430 162 92 563 72 118 402 250 1227 500 4140 
2001 199 78 340 140 63 388 46 115 369 254 1124 416 3532 
2002 204 74 304 108 69 425 52 101 368 265 1055 396 3421 
2003 198 80 313 129 75 533 74 100 376 271 1063 423 3635 
2004 198 75 371 146 77 606 75 107 392 283 1074 452 3856 
2005 189 73 348 152 76 608 81 115 357 264 1055 444 3762 
2006 179 72 346 167 88 570 77 115 349 258 971 440 3632 
2007 166 65 324 155 77 527 72 115 316 238 795 394 3244 
2008 122 47 268 133 68 423 49 109 244 216 621 328 2628 
2009 141 47 234 87 66 416 58 109 267 216 527 312 2480 
2010 153 72 291 130 85 489 75 105 283 217 710 325 2935 
2011 144 80 297 147 75 464 79 101 284 188 754 329 2942 
2012 138 69 293 130 71 411 72 94 278 183 818 323 2880 
2013 136 61 265 137 70 388 68 98 277 170 851 338 2859 
2014 136 64 265 131 78 375 63 106 284 172 899 330 2903 
2015 125 65 240 41 66 345 63 95 269 172 912 338 2731 
Total 2655 1119 4929 2095 1196 7531 1076 1703 5115 3617 14456 6088 51580 
This table reports the number of firms in the COMPUSTAT sample that are classified by each of the 
Fama-French (1997) industry classifications from the years 2000-2015.  
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Table 2: Descriptive Statistics for Firm Observations 
Variable Mean St.Dev Q1 Median Q3 Min Max 
Index Score 4.75 1.525 4 5 6 0 8 
ROA 0.063357 0.0801625 0.013238 0.041744 0.082883 0 0.9969 
Tobin's Q 1.1710882 1.1635107 1.032278 1.286339 1.929616 0.0011 9.9839 
Total Assets 7108.320998 58295.13873 166.65025 634.2725 2334.826 0.052 2573126 
Leverage 0.161285 0.178392 0.006784 0.102078 0.261199 0 0.9993 
Market-to-Book 598.77169 43535.32374 10.940779 47.917482 173.19776 -648635.4 9739458.3 
Current Ratio 3.726197 74.7720983 1.296607 1.984553 3.134772 0 13545 
This table reports the descriptive statistics for the COMPUSTAT dataset for the sample period between 
the years 2000-2015. 
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Table 3: Univariate Tests for ROA 
ROA       
 
High 
Corruption 
Low 
Corruption 
Difference 
Full Sample 0.069007 0.060593 0.08*** 
Large Firm 0.051542 0.047438 0.004*** 
Small Firm 0.103713 0.093575 0.01*** 
High Leverage 0.054378 0.052033 0.002** 
Low Leverage 0.100395 0.094223 0.006*** 
High Liquidity 0.097312 0.096802 0.001 
Low Liquidity 0.058146 0.049374 0.01*** 
High Performance 0.16405 0.155935 0.008*** 
Low Performance 0.007594 0.007373 0.00*** 
Growth Firm 2.643747 2.671712 -0.028 
Value Firm 1.175175 1.113145 0.062*** 
***p<0.01, **p<0.05, *p<0.10 
This table reports our univariate test results that compare the differences between ROA in high and low 
corruption states between the years 2000-2015. We report our statistical significance by asterisks as 
defined above.  
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Table 4: Univariate Tests for Tobin’s Q 
Tobin's Q       
 
High 
Corruption 
Low 
Corruption 
Difference 
Full Sample 1.766756 1.683553 0.093*** 
Large Firm 1.622732 1.561094 0.062*** 
Small Firm 1.988644 1.923568 0.065** 
High Leverage 1.513134 1.56448 -0.051*** 
Low Leverage 2.283456 2.206027 0.077** 
High Liquidity 2.247992 2.21553 0.032 
Low Liquidity 1.582106 1.518713 0.072*** 
High Performance 0.121486 0.117628 0.004** 
Low Performance 0.039467 0.029494 0.01*** 
Growth Firm 3.232783 3.202956 0.03 
Value Firm 0.898802 0.936973 -0.038*** 
***p<0.01, **p<0.05, *p<0.10 
This table reports our univariate test results that compare the differences between Tobin’s Q in high and 
low corruption states between the years 2000-2015. We report our statistical significance by asterisks as 
defined above.  
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Table 5: Effect of Corruption on ROA and Tobin’s Q 
  ROA ROA ROA Tobin's Q Tobin's Q Tobin's Q 
Variable OLS OLS+FE OLS 
+FE+Lagged 
OLS OLS+FE OLS+FE+Lagged 
Corruption Score 0.044*** 
(10.745) 
0.033*** 
(8.013) 
0.020*** 
(5.213) 
0.031*** 
(7.442) 
0.025*** 
(6.159) 
0.009*** 
(2.701) 
Size -0.13*** 
(-28.576) 
-0.138 
(-29.646) 
-0.107 
(-24.823) 
0.029*** 
(6.413) 
0.033*** 
(7.135) 
-0.011*** 
(-2.985) 
Leverage -0.003 
(-0.633) 
-0.038 
(-8.333) 
-0.026 
(-6.256) 
-0.032*** 
(-7.375) 
-0.04*** 
(-8.736) 
-0.014*** 
(-3.827) 
Market-Book 0.006 
(1.513) 
0.006 
(1.586) 
0.004 
(1.192) 
0.009** 
(2.199) 
0.009** 
(2.310) 
0.005 
(1.526) 
Liquidity 0.295*** 
(64.68) 
0.231 
(34.387) 
0.161 
(25.820) 
0.359*** 
(78.212) 
0.267*** 
(40.177) 
0.136*** 
(26.112) 
Lagged Variables No No Yes No No Yes 
Year Fixed Effects? No Yes Yes No Yes Yes 
Industry Fixed 
Effects? 
No Yes Yes No Yes Yes 
R2 0.14 0.161 0.286 0.13 0.175 0.504 
F-stat 1686.04 319.72 644.5 1537.59 353.48 1637.66 
p-value 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Sample Size 51580 51580 51580 51580 51580 51580 
Robust standard errors in parentheses 
***p<0.01, **p<0.05, *p<0.10 
This table reports the results of using four factors plus the corruption score as determined by the index 
to explain the ROA and Tobin’s Q for firms between the years 2000-2015. In panels 1-3 ROA is our 
dependant variables, while panels 4-6 displays Tobin’s Q as our dependant variable. Each panel features 
control variable treatments as described below.  
OLS – simplest cross-frim OLS regression with no industry or time controls. Excludes lagged variable 
testing. Controls for firm effects. Columns 1 and 4 analyze of the effect of corruption on ROA from 2000-
2015 socioeconomic data. 
OLS+FE – Cross-frim OLS regression with industry or time controls. Excludes lagged variable testing. 
Controls for firm effects. Columns 2 and 4 analyze of the effect of corruption on ROA from 2000-2015 
socioeconomic data. 
OLS+FE+Lagged – Cross-frim OLS regression with industry or time controls. Includes lagged variable 
testing. Controls for firm effects. Columns 3 and 6 analyze of the effect of corruption on ROA from 2000-
2015 socioeconomic data. 
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Table 6: Supplementary Models 
Robust 
standard error in parentheses 
***p<0.01, **p<0.05, *p<0.10 
This table reports the results of using four factors plus the corruption score as determined by the index to explain the ROA and Tobin’s Q for 
firms between the years 2000-2015. In panels 1-3 ROA is our dependant variables, while panels 4-6 displays Tobin’s Q as our dependant variable. 
Each panel features control variable treatments that incorporate firm and industry control variables, without lagged variables. R2, F-stat, p-value, 
and sample size statistics are also included.  
  ROA ROA ROA ROA Tobin's Q Tobin's Q Tobin's Q Tobin’s Q 
Variable Excl. 
Crisis 
Only Election Post-SOX Pre-CU Excl. 
Crisis 
Only 
Election 
Post-SOX Pre-CU 
 
    
Corruption 
Score 
0.032*** 0.037*** .035*** 0.037*** 0.030*** 0.023*** 0.023*** 0.027*** 
(7.068) (6.308) (7.562) (7.278) (6.784) (3.91) (5.033) (5.401) 
 Size -0.148*** -0.138*** -0.131*** -.142*** 0.027*** 0.029*** 0.002 0.045*** 
(-28.967) (-21.051) (-25.039) (-24.953) (5.248) (4.508) (0.414) (8.10) 
Leverage -0.037*** -0.042*** -0.031*** -0.050*** -0.04*** -0.047*** -0.023*** -0.071*** 
(-7.479) (-6.507) (-5.887) (-8.934) (-8.115) (-7.458) (-4.38) (-12.749) 
Market-Book 0.036*** 0.041*** 0.006 0.005 0.053** 0.079*** 0.007* 0.008 
(8.125) (7.164) (1.273) (.981) (12.035) (13.906) (1.655) (1.565) 
Liquidity 0.225*** .238*** 0.245*** .211*** 0.259*** .253*** 0.281*** 0.262*** 
(30.397) (25.298) (32.498) (25.375) (35.466) (27.094) (37.549) (32.053) 
Lagged 
Variables 
No No No No No No No No 
Year Fixed 
Effects? 
Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry Fixed 
Effects? 
Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
R2 0.164 0.163 0.167 .155 0.181 0.175 0.181 .182 
F-stat 300.187 223.071 288.004 250.374 339.235 241.468 318.1 302.857 
p-value 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
Sample Size 43029 26289 40385 34164 43029 26289 40385 34164 
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Table 7: Corruption Index Score by Year 
 
Year Mean Median Min Max 
2000 4.994444 5 2 8 
2001 4.805493 5 2 8 
2002 4.986554 5 2 8 
2003 4.704264 5 2 8 
2004 4.817427 5 1 8 
2005 4.947103 6 0 8 
2006 4.922357 5 0 8 
2007 4.479346 4 1 7 
2008 4.969559 5 1 8 
2009 4.695565 5 1 8 
2010 4.656899 5 1 7 
2011 4.664174 5 1 7 
2012 4.818403 5 1 7 
2013 4.436866 5 1 6 
2014 4.404065 5 1 6 
2015 4.421091 5 1 6 
Total 4.748371 5 0 8 
This table reports the yearly descriptive statistics from the corruption index from the years 2000-2015.  
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Table 8: Corruption Index Score by State and Year 
This table reports the yearly index scores for each corruption variables by state for the years 2000-2015.   
State 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 Mean 
AL 5 4 4 4 6 6 6 6 5 5 5 4 4 4 4 5 4.8125 
AK 4 3 3 2 3 2 3 3 4 4 4 4 5 5 4 3 3.5 
AZ 6 5 5 5 5 5 6 5 6 5 3 3 4 5 5 5 4.875 
AR 4 5 5 5 5 5 4 5 4 5 4 5 5 4 4 4 4.5625 
CA 6 6 6 6 5 6 6 6 6 5 5 5 6 6 6 6 5.75 
CO 7 6 5 5 5 5 6 4 6 5 6 6 6 5 5 5 5.4375 
CT 5 6 6 6 6 6 4 4 3 4 3 3 4 4 3 3 4.375 
DE 3 4 5 6 4 4 6 4 5 5 4 4 3 4 5 5 4.4375 
FL 5 5 5 5 5 4 5 4 4 4 5 5 4 4 4 4 4.5 
GA 8 8 7 8 7 8 5 4 4 5 5 6 6 5 4 4 5.875 
HI 6 5 5 4 6 5 6 5 5 6 7 7 7 6 4 4 5.5 
ID 4 5 5 6 5 5 5 5 4 4 5 5 5 5 5 5 4.875 
IL 4 5 5 5 4 6 4 3 3 4 3 4 4 2 3 4 3.9375 
IN 4 3 5 5 4 3 5 4 5 5 4 3 3 3 2 2 3.75 
IA 3 3 3 3 4 4 3 4 5 6 5 5 5 5 5 4 4.1875 
KS 2 4 4 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 4 4 3 3 3 3.1875 
KY 4 4 4 3 4 4 4 3 4 4 3 3 2 1 1 1 3.0625 
LA 4 3 3 3 4 6 7 6 7 7 6 6 7 5 4 3 5.0625 
ME 2 2 2 3 4 3 3 3 2 2 2 2 3 2 2 2 2.4375 
MD 4 4 4 5 3 3 4 4 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3.4375 
MA 4 4 4 4 5 5 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 3 3 3 3.9375 
MI 4 2 3 2 1 1 2 1 2 3 3 3 3 2 3 3 2.375 
MN 4 5 5 5 6 6 4 3 4 3 5 6 5 5 5 5 4.75 
MS 4 3 3 3 4 4 5 4 5 5 5 4 4 4 4 4 4.0625 
MO 4 3 3 4 3 3 4 4 4 3 3 2 4 3 4 4 3.4375 
MT 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 3 3 3 2 1 2 2 2.125 
NE 5 7 8 8 8 6 6 5 6 8 6 6 7 6 6 5 6.4375 
NV 4 3 4 4 4 4 4 2 3 2 4 3 3 2 1 1 3 
NH 7 6 7 7 6 7 7 7 6 4 4 5 5 5 5 5 5.8125 
NJ 3 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3.4375 
NM 3 3 4 5 4 4 5 4 5 5 5 4 4 4 4 4 4.1875 
NY 6 5 5 5 6 6 6 5 7 7 7 7 7 6 5 5 5.9375 
NC 7 7 6 6 5 6 7 6 6 5 6 5 5 6 6 6 5.9375 
ND 5 6 6 5 4 5 6 5 5 6 7 7 6 5 5 5 5.5 
OH 4 2 4 2 1 0 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 3 3 3 1.75 
OK 3 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 6 6 6 4 4 4 4.3125 
OR 5 3 2 2 3 2 4 4 5 5 6 6 6 4 4 5 4.125 
PA 3 4 5 2 4 3 3 4 4 4 4 5 4 5 5 5 4 
RI 2 2 3 3 3 4 2 1 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 2.75 
SC 5 4 3 4 4 5 4 4 5 5 5 5 6 5 5 5 4.625 
SD 4 6 6 6 6 6 5 5 6 7 5 6 7 5 4 5 5.5625 
TN 6 6 4 4 5 4 4 3 5 3 3 4 4 3 2 2 3.875 
TX 7 6 6 5 7 7 8 7 8 7 7 6 7 6 6 6 6.625 
UT 5 5 5 5 4 5 4 6 5 5 5 5 5 4 5 5 4.875 
VT 5 5 5 4 3 3 3 3 3 4 4 3 3 2 2 2 3.375 
VA 5 6 6 6 5 5 5 4 6 6 4 4 4 4 5 5 5 
WA 4 4 6 6 6 6 6 5 4 4 6 6 5 4 5 5 5.125 
WV 2 2 2 2 2 2 3 2 4 3 2 2 2 3 3 3 2.4375 
WI 3 3 4 3 3 3 2 2 3 3 2 2 2 2 2 3 2.625 
WY 4 5 5 6 6 5 4 4 4 5 6 6 5 4 4 3 4.75 
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Appendix II: Control Variable Definitions 
For the univariate tests the data are coded to indicate differences in firm characteristics. 
The dummy variables include large firm, small firm, high leverage, low leverage, high liquidity, 
low liquidity, high performance, low performance, growth, and value firms. In addition to all of 
these, the full sample without the dummy’s applied to the data is reported. 
𝐹𝑖𝑟𝑚 𝑆𝑖𝑧𝑒 = 𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝐴𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡𝑠 
𝐿𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑔𝑒 =
𝐿𝑜𝑛𝑔 𝑇𝑒𝑟𝑚 𝐷𝑒𝑏𝑡
𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝐴𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡𝑠
 
𝐿𝑖𝑞𝑢𝑖𝑑𝑖𝑡𝑦 =
𝐶𝑢𝑟𝑟𝑒𝑛𝑡 𝐴𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡𝑠
𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝐴𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡𝑠
 
𝑀𝑎𝑟𝑘𝑒𝑡 𝑡𝑜 𝐵𝑜𝑜𝑘 =
𝑀𝑎𝑟𝑘𝑒𝑡 𝐶𝑎𝑝𝑖𝑡𝑎𝑙𝑖𝑧𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛
𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝐵𝑜𝑜𝑘 𝑉𝑎𝑙𝑢𝑒
   
The dummy variables were created by dividing the total sample into quartiles and ranking 
them for each of the classifications above. For the dummy variables they are ranked “high” or 
“large” as being in the largest quartile (4th) and ranked “small” or “low” as being in the smallest 
quartiles (1st). In addition to the dummy variables above, there were two additional dummy 
variables, “performance” and “growth/value”. The performance variable is simply ROA while 
growth/value is Tobin’s Q. “High” performance was designated as a firm with an ROA in the 
largest quartile (4th) while “low” performance was designated as a firm with an ROA in the 
smallest quartile (1st). The same procedure was followed with growth/value with Tobin’s Q 
being in the largest quartile (4th) indicting “growth” firms, and Tobin’s Q being in the smallest 
quartile (1st) indicating “value” firms. 
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